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TOXIC MISOGYNY AND THE LIMITS 
OF COUNTERSPEECH 
Lynne Tirrell* 
INTRODUCTION:  SPEECH AS HARM 
Gender equality, across all the ways that we humans are engendered, is an 
unrealized ideal of many contemporary Americans.  It is not enshrined in the 
U.S. Constitution, unless one interprets “men” to include women, which the 
Framers did not.1  Although passed by Congress in 1972, the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) failed to gain the necessary thirty-eight state 
ratifications, and it has never become law.2  Thirty-five states initially ratified 
it between 1972 and 1977,3 then two more in 2017 and 2018.4  It remains one 
state short.  These ratifications indicate significant social progress for 
women, but the progress is uneven, even within states that have supported 
the ERA.  Offering a glimmer of hope, the Senate of Virginia voted to ratify 
the ERA in February 2019, but the measure was killed in committee by the 
Republican-controlled House of Delegates.5  Women remain constitutionally 
unequal. 
Achieving equal rights requires closing constitutional gaps and eliminating 
the widespread and varied social practices that reinforce sexism and 
misogyny.  Rampant misogyny is not just found in the words and images of 
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Symposium entitled Gender Equality and the First Amendment, hosted by the Fordham Law 
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the Symposium, see Jeanmarie Fenrich, Benjamin C. Zipursky & Danielle Keats Citron, 
Foreword:  Gender Equality and the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2019).  
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 1. See Allison L. Held et al., The Equal Rights Amendment:  Why the ERA Remains 
Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 113–14 
(1997). 
 2. See Sarah A. Soule & Susan Olzak, When Do Movements Matter?  The Politics of 
Contingency and the Equal Rights Amendment, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 473, 475 (2004).  The ERA 
would guarantee legal gender equality for women and men. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Ratification Info State by State, ERA, https://www.equalrightsamendment.org/era-
ratification-map [http://perma.cc/9XY4-DXQT] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 5. Jenna Portnoy, ERA Bill Dies for Good in GOP-Controlled Virginia House of 
Delegates, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-
politics/virginia-house-kills-era-ratification-bill/2019/02/21/82920204-3560-11e9-854a-7a14 
d7fec96a_story.html [http://perma.cc/5CT9-72TF]. 
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internet trolls.  It is the heart of advertising, literature, journalistic practice, 
and more.  Misogynist discourse, in speech and images, inflicts tremendous 
harm on women every day, reinforcing lower social status, and rationalizing 
discrimination and mistreatment—including unequal pay, sexual abuse and 
violence, and more.  The U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment gives priority 
to freedom of speech because of the power of speech.  It is often easy to 
identify bad speech that causes harm, but there are forms of speech that harm 
in stealthier ways.  Some courts, following Justice Louis Brandeis, hold that 
the cure for bad speech, which is harmful and undermining on a daily basis, 
is more speech.6  U.S. Supreme Court doctrine favors such counterspeech 
over censorship, except in cases of incitement.7  Unfortunately, gender 
egalitarians cannot have both fully free expression, which is rife with 
misogyny, and gender justice. 
Free speech is a crucial component of a free society, and although it is not 
absolute, protecting freedom of expression matters, especially to the most 
vulnerable among us.8  Freedom of expression is an engine of autonomy.  As 
philosophers María C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman have argued, 
“[T]he articulation of our experience is part of our experience.”9  Therefore, 
“it matters to us what is said about us, who says it, and to whom it is said:  
having the opportunity to talk about one’s life, to give an account of it, to 
interpret it, is integral to leading that life rather than being led through it.”10  
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights demands a 
universal right to freedom of expression, including “freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”11  Thus, freedom of 
expression ought to be respected across a range of significant contexts. 
This freedom comes at a price, particularly to those most vulnerable, who 
are often targeted by nasty speech that has harmful effects on their freedom 
to work, learn, and develop in myriad ways.  It is not easy to discern the best 
methods for responding to nasty speech such as hate speech, racist rhetoric, 
and sexist comments that impose dignitary harms.  Such harms can chill 
expression in a workplace or a classroom—an effect that undermines 
individual and social growth and development.  Legal responses have been 
 
 6. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled 
in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  For a thoughtful defense of 
counterspeech, see generally Maxime Lepoutre, Hate Speech in Public Discourse:  A 
Pessimistic Defense of Counterspeech, 43 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 851 (2017). 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 726–27 (2012). 
 8. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 1–17 (2012); Mari J. Matsuda, 
Public Response to Racist Speech:  Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 
2350 (1989). 
 9. María C. Lugones & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Have We Got a Theory for You!  Feminist 
Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for ‘the Woman’s Voice,’ 6 WOMEN’S STUD. 
INT’L F. 573, 574 (1983). 
 10. Id. at 573. 
 11. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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stymied by the principle of viewpoint neutrality,12 but advocates for fighting 
dignitary harms cannot see speech promoting the damage and destruction of 
half the human race as simply a viewpoint.  Justice Kagan has argued that 
harm-based arguments are not really independent of the viewpoint arguments 
and that they stand or fall together.13  This creates legal minefields.  Perhaps 
the deepest problem is that misogyny is so thoroughly woven into the norms 
and practices of society that it can neither be treated as a mere viewpoint nor 
as special discriminatory harm.  It is a harm of which we are made, a deeply 
constitutive harm, so it will not be easily gainsaid. 
Along these lines, in 1993 Justice Kagan wrote, “I take it as a given that 
we live in a society marred by racial and gender inequality, that certain forms 
of speech perpetuate and promote this inequality, and that the uncoerced 
disappearance of such speech would be cause for great elation.”14  The key 
here is lack of coercion, presumably by government and law, but misogyny 
is often ruled by the coerciveness of the court of public opinion.  John Stuart 
Mill, for example, worried about both government coercion and what he 
called “the tyranny of the majority,”15 and this led him to develop strong 
arguments for protecting freedom of speech and thought.16  Mill was also 
concerned that custom and habit, sometimes aided by reason, would 
overpower new ideas before they could get a fair hearing.17  He was attuned 
to imbalances of power, particularly between the lone novice with a 
potentially great new idea and the entrenched majority that does not want to 
hear it.18  To take this idea more seriously, one must understand how speech 
can be constitutive of society’s members and can douse the spark of new 
ideas.  It is essential to see harms as not only aftereffects but as woven 
through the whole social fabric. 
Counterspeech has limited power and reach, and often the most vulnerable 
targets of nasty speech are not in a position to reply with “more speech.”  This 
raises the issue of which social positions are graced with the power of “more 
speech” and which are denied such power; it also raises the question of how 
to change these imbalances.  State-sponsored and enacted censorship is a 
blunt tool, which might be sought as protection for the vulnerable, and yet it 
 
 12. Viewpoint neutrality is a well-established principle in First Amendment law that 
prohibits the government, when taking action that implicate free speech rights, from 
discriminating against specific viewpoints. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and 
Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 702 (2011). 
 13. See Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 873, 880 (1993). 
 14. Id. at 873. 
 15. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5, 8 
(John Gray ed., 1991). 
 16. Id. at 21 (“But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is 
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from 
the opinion, still more than those who hold it.  If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth:  if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, 
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”). 
 17. Id. at 7–8; see also JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 6 (Transaction 
Publishers 2001) (1869). 
 18. MILL, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
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can also be wielded against those who are vulnerable and whose views are 
deemed inconvenient.19  Misogyny is a dominant hegemonic force.20  Some 
critical legal and critical race theorists, focusing on racist hate speech, have 
argued that the vulnerable pay the highest price for the free speech of others 
even though they rarely have such freedom themselves.21  Accordingly, they 
have posited that we should protect the vulnerable against certain forms of 
derogation by providing tort remedies or even censoring the harmful speech 
outright.22  The fight between free speech advocates and those who seek 
stronger enforcement of equal protection tends to be liberal infighting,23 with 
each side seeing the importance of the general principles but being unable to 
settle questions of priority. 
In Only Words, Catharine MacKinnon makes the argument that hate 
speech and pornography are better understood as discrimination than 
defamation.24  MacKinnon’s arguments also apply to the toxic misogyny of 
sexist advertising, cultural images, and speech practices that put women qua 
women in a secondary place—not just as citizens and political participants 
but as human beings.  MacKinnon uses Roberts v. United States Jaycees25 to 
argue that equality is a compelling state interest.26  In Jaycees, the Supreme 
Court sided with Roberts and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights 
and held that the Jaycees were required to allow women to enjoy full 
membership in light of the size and scope of the membership and the purpose 
of the organization.27  From Jaycees, MacKinnon concludes that “expressive 
means of practicing inequality can be prohibited.”28 
 
 19. For example, Indiana and Minnesota’s anti-pornography laws and the Canadian 
Supreme Court decision R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.), set out to protect women, 
but they were all disproportionately used against gay and lesbian pornography. See, e.g., Susan 
R. Taylor, Gay and Lesbian Pornography and the Obscenity Laws in Canada, 8 DALHOUSIE 
J. LEGAL STUD. 94, 95 (1999). 
 20. See KATE MANNE, DOWN GIRL:  THE LOGIC OF MISOGYNY 20 (2018).  For a brief 
glossary of key terms, see Annie McGrew & Kate Bahn, What Is Misogyny and Why Should 
You Care?, MEDIUM (Sept. 28, 2017), https://medium.com/@amprog/what-is-misogyny-and-
why-should-you-care-90ef7d4174aa [http://perma.cc/7HJ9-ARQ6]. 
 21. See, e.g., Noah Berlatsky, Is the First Amendment Too Broad?  The Case for 
Regulating Hate Speech in America, NBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
think/opinion/first-amendment-too-broad-case-regulating-hate-speech-america-ncna832246 
[http://perma.cc/8LF5-C8FM] (explaining that “free speech rights have rarely protected black 
people in this country” yet free speech advocates suggest “victims should toughen up and 
ignore hateful words, or accept them as the price of freedom”). 
 22. See generally MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND:  CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) (discussing various 
perspectives and analyses on the need to regulate hate speech); Brian Owsley, Note, Racist 
Speech and Reasonable People:  A Proposal for a Tort Remedy, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 323 (1993) (proposing a new tort remedy for victims of racist speech). 
 23. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Four Observations About Hate Speech, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 360–61 (2009). 
 24. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 3–43 (1993) (discussing 
defamation and discrimination). 
 25. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 26. See MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 146 n.64. 
 27. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 28. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 107. 
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Current Supreme Court doctrine on restrictions of speech harkens back at 
least to Schenck v. United States,29 in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr. first articulated the “clear and present danger” test under which the 
government has a right to regulate speech that will bring about “substantive 
evils.”30  Schenck also focused on differences between regulation in times of 
war and times of peace.31  More definitively, Brandenburg v. Ohio32 
established a two-part test for regulating speech:  (1) whether the speech is 
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” and (2) whether 
the speech is “likely to incite or produce such action.”33  A speaker would 
have to intend to bring about “imminent lawless action” and harm, and the 
probability of that harm would have to be significant.34  As Richard Wilson 
has pointed out, Brandenburg and prior decisions were about protecting the 
state itself, but it was only in the late twentieth century that the law began to 
address the issue of protecting citizens from the harmful speech of one 
another.35  This is a welcome development.  There are problems with 
determining both of Brandenburg’s factors, but we can set them aside as 
being of little help with cases in which the imminent harms are part of the 
very fabric of an unjust society.  Incitement to criminal action is itself a 
crime—independent of any dignitary harms it imposes. 
The daily onslaught of misogynist speech and images36 endangers women 
and causes significant social, psychological, and economic harms37 to both 
our sense of well-being and our actual safety and development.  Ubiquitous 
in patriarchal societies, misogyny is inherent in the structural norms that 
shape gender identities, relationships, economics, and politics—it is woven 
into the very fabric of society.38  Despite its clarity, presence, and 
 
 29. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 30. Id. at 52. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 33. Id. at 447. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Richard Ashby Wilson & Jordan Kiper, Brandenburg in an Era of Populism:  Risk 
Analysis in the First Amendment 34 (Feb. 6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3330195 [http://perma.cc/ZU45-4PWC]. 
 36. For a compendium of sexist and misogynist comments from the forty-fifth president 
of the United States, see Claire Cohen, Donald Trump Sexism Tracker:  Every Offensive 
Comment in One Place, TELEGRAPH (July 14, 2017, 9:03 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
women/politics/donald-trump-sexism-tracker-every-offensive-comment-in-one-place/ 
[https://perma.cc/5VNW-9PU3]; and see also Berit Brogaard, 12 Ways to Spot a Misogynist, 
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-mysteries-
love/201502/12-ways-spot-misogynist [https://perma.cc/4FSF-N4BZ]. 
 37. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993).  See generally Julia 
Gillard, Speech to Australian Parliament (Oct. 10, 2012) (transcript available at 
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/transcript-of-julia-gillards-speech-20121010-
27c36.html [https://perma.cc/DMN6-R3TF]) (denouncing misogyny in public life). 
 38. See Sopen B. Shah, Open Season:  Street Harassment as True Threats, 18 U. PA. J.L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 377, 390–96 (2016); see also Maeve Olney, Toward a Socially Responsible 
Application of the Criminal Law to the Problem of Street Harassment, 22 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 129, 133–38 (2015).  For an example of street harassment, see Rob Bliss 
Creative, 10 Hours of Walking in NYC as a Woman, YOUTUBE (Oct. 28, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1XGPvbWn0A [https://perma.cc/C9WT-D267]. 
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dangerousness, most misogyny will fail the “clear and present danger” test 
time and again.  Unfortunately, imminence tests like Brandenburg will not 
help dismantle systemic oppressions. 
For anyone concerned with justice, the question is not whether something 
should be done about the misogynist onslaught girls and women encounter; 
the question is:  What should be done, and who should do it?  Supreme Court 
doctrine may favor counterspeech to tort remedies or criminalization, but to 
justify this we need a robust conception of what sorts of speech might have 
the power to counter oppressive speech, who can achieve it, and under what 
circumstances.39  In setting policy, we cannot assume a speech encounter 
between equally powerful adults, each fully free to speak their minds and 
each with the backing of deep and broad social norms.  Where inequality 
reigns, the odds are not in favor of someone who tries to combat the bad 
speech of the powerful with the more speech of the vulnerable.40  This paper 
explores the mechanisms of counterspeech and the limits of the remedies 
counterspeech can provide.  By understanding the very concept of misogyny 
and considering some mechanics of the ways language works, we can gain a 
better picture of the prospect of creating normative change through 
counterspeech. 
I.  TOXIC MISOGYNY 
“Misogyny” is the ubiquitous common coin of the patriarchal realm.  
Perhaps no one has done more to focus attention on the power of words and 
images to harm women than MacKinnon.  She pioneered sexual harassment 
law,41 crafted and fought for anti-pornography legislation,42 helped get rape 
recognized as a war crime through her testimony at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Akayesu,43 and so much more.  In a 
 
 39. See generally Mary Kate McGowan, Responding to Harmful Speech:  The More 
Speech Response, Counter Speech, and the Complexity of Language Use, in VOICING DISSENT:  
THE ETHICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF MAKING DISAGREEMENT PUBLIC 182, 182–99 (Casey 
Rebecca Johnson ed., 2018). 
 40. One might think policy should also address the bad speech of the vulnerable against 
the powerful, but the powerful (qua powerful) have a platform; their speech tends to carry the 
day. 
 41. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32–47 
(1979) (introducing quid pro quo harassment versus harassment due to the conditions of 
work). 
 42. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood:  Censorship, Pornography, and 
Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 13 (1985); Winifred Ann Sandler, The Minneapolis Anti-
Pornography Ordinance:  A Valid Assertion of Civil Rights?, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 909, 
909–10 (1985). 
 43. Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment (June 1, 2001).  See generally Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally:  A Comment on Akayesu, 44 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 940 (2006); Valerie Oosterveld, Gender-Sensitive Justice and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda:  Lessons Learned for the International Criminal 
Court, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119 (2005); Helen Trouille, How Far Has the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Really Come Since Akayesu in the Prosecution 
and Investigation of Sexual Offences Committed Against Women?  An Analysis of 
Ndindiliyimana et al., 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 747 (2013). 
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recent paper discussing the significance of MacKinnon’s work, Susan Brison 
offered this focus on the power of language, saying: 
We’re told they’re ‘only words,’ but we live and die by them. We’re 
born into them and made out of them. They welcome us to the world—
whether harshly or warmly—and, if we’re lucky, at the end of our days, 
they may help to ease our way as we leave it. In between, they undo and 
remake us, destroy and sustain us. They are never simply the construction 
we choose to put on things. They are our inheritance and our legacy, our 
ancestors and our descendants, our past, our future, and who we are now.44 
On this constitutive view of the self, speech and images matter because the 
self is socially constituted by the words, images, and other social 
constructions that not only mediate our experiences but actually constitute 
experiences.  Some speech and images enhance freedom and shape 
autonomy, which enables people to build the world of tomorrow.  This is why 
freedom of expression matters.  And yet, misogynist speech and images 
curtail women’s freedoms, damage our autonomy, and limit our capacity to 
contribute to society now and in the future.45  In Only Words, MacKinnon 
makes the argument that hate speech and pornography are better understood 
as discrimination than as defamation.46  When most words and images that 
surround, shape, and even constitute us are misogynist, these should be seen 
as simultaneously defamatory and discriminatory.  When these words and 
images are, so to speak, part of the very air we breathe, it becomes hard to 
see misogyny for what it is and a terrible challenge to figure out how to 
mitigate its harms.  It sounds exaggerated and redundant to say “toxic 
misogyny,” so we must first understand what misogyny is. 
Merriam-Webster defines “misogyny” simply as “a hatred of women,” 
which suggests an individual psychological state.47  In an egalitarian society, 
a lone outlier who vilifies and disparages women might be a nuisance, an 
annoyance, or even a danger to others, but cannot alone constitute a toxic 
social situation.  In such a case, our overall egalitarian norms would counter 
the outlier.  The lone “incel”48 who blames women for his loneliness and 
strikes out is distressing, but, so long as he remains an isolated and random 
phenomenon, he is not our subject.  His ideology is misogynist, and his 
 
 44. Susan Brison, ‘We Must Find Words or Burn’:  Speaking Out Against Disciplinary 
Silencing, 3 FEMINIST PHIL. Q., no. 2, 2017, at 1, 9–10. 
 45. See SANDRA LEE BARTKY, FEMININITY AND DOMINATION:  STUDIES IN THE 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF OPPRESSION 22–32 (1990). 
 46. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 3–43. 
 47. Misogyny, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
misogyny [https://perma.cc/AK9Y-SKFV] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  The Oxford English 
Dictionary offers “[d]islike of, contempt for, or ingrained prejudice against women.” 
Misogyny, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
misogyny [https://perma.cc/W4NY-ZTZF] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 48. The term “incel” refers to “the online community of ‘involuntarily celibate’ men 
radicalized by their shared mistrust of women.” Rebecca Jennings, Incels Categorize Women 
by Personal Style and Attractiveness, VOX (Apr. 28, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/4/28/17290256/incel-chad-stacy-becky [https://perma.cc/752L-
STJK]. 
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actions might lead to punishable crimes, but the crimes are what would be 
punished, not the ideology. 
When there is a movement of incels spreading an extremist ideology of 
oppressing women and declaring that violence is justified, then we are in the 
realm of overt and toxic misogyny.49  This extreme example should not be 
our central case.  These extremists are motivated by a variety of 
psychological needs that are exaggerations of ordinary heterosexist society.  
That is, they take assumptions about male entitlement and female availability 
to an extreme, and they act on them in ways that not only violate social 
norms, but break laws.50  Just the same, misogyny is everywhere around us, 
so no misogynist stands alone, and the extremism is rooted in everyday 
assumptions and power dynamics. 
Toxic misogyny is a feature of patriarchy’s very structure.  Accordingly, 
Andrea Dworkin’s groundbreaking 1974 book Woman Hating never really 
addresses individual hate as a psychological state because her target is to 
develop “an analysis of sexism (that system of male dominance), what it is, 
how it operates on us and in us.”51  So, even as early as 1974, misogyny was 
being treated as systemic; it did not require a psychological state or a guilty 
mind, but it was instead rooted in patterns of dominance.52  It is not an 
attitude of an outlier, but an intrinsic dimension of society. 
In an influential 1983 essay, philosopher Marilyn Frye argued that the 
locus of sexism is in the system or framework, not in the individual act; she 
takes individual acts to be sexist insofar as they serve to support that 
system.53  The system is an elaborate set of practices of “sex-marking” and 
“sex-announcing” that “divide the species, along lines of sex, into dominators 
and subordinates.”54  Discrimination is a precondition for this system of 
dominance to work.  So we find ways to speak and act toward others that 
mark their sex, and we are each and all required to announce our own sex 
through patterns of speech, attire, comportment, attention, and more.  No one 
needs to be trying to support the system; all it takes is behavior that coheres.  
Frye did not address the situations of nonbinary and genderqueer people, but 
her analysis shows why they are subjected to so much violence—because 
they are failing to support the discriminatory categories that uphold 
heteronormative patriarchy.55 
 
 49. For a policy brief on the security issues raised by the rise of incel ideology, see 
generally Shannon Zimmerman et al., Recognizing the Violent Extremist Ideology of ‘Incels,’ 
WOMEN INT’L SECURITY, Sept. 2018, at 1.  For further discussion, see also Amia Srinivasan, 
Does Anyone Have the Right to Sex?, 40 LONDON REV. BOOKS, Mar. 22, 2018, at 5; and Jia 
Tolentino, The Rage of the Incels, NEW YORKER (May 15, 2018), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
culture/cultural-comment/the-rage-of-the-incels [https://perma.cc/94JE-ZTX9]. 
 50. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 20, at 34–41 (analyzing Elliot Rodger, who uploaded a 
video explaining that he wanted to punish women before going on a killing spree). 
 51. ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMEN HATING 17 (1974). 
 52. See id. 
 53. MARILYN FRYE, Sexism, in THE POLITICS OF REALITY:  ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 
17, 38 (1983). 
 54. Id. at 29, 38. 
 55. See id. 
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Most recently, philosopher Kate Manne’s trenchant theory of misogyny is 
akin to Frye’s but with changed, ameliorative terminology.56  Manne defines 
sexism as a form of ideology that distinguishes between men and women; it 
is about ideology and beliefs that discriminate.57  So far, Manne and Frye 
agree, but for Frye, sexism is all in the practices, and beliefs are not the 
issue.58  The patterns of sex-marking and sex-announcing that “divide the 
species, along lines of sex, into dominators and subordinates” might be seen 
as a form of ideology in practice.59  Given that both are concerned with 
practices that damage women, we are still in friendly territory.  Manne’s 
originality is in seeing misogyny as about distinguishing good women from 
bad women, and punishing the bad.60  Manne wants to dissuade us from 
thinking of misogyny as hate; she instead encourages us to see it as power.  
It is about punishing women who violate the norms of patriarchy.  Girls and 
women are thus subjected to great “surveillance, scrutiny, and suspicion.”61  
Manne says, “at the most general level of description, misogyny should be 
understood as the ‘law enforcement’ branch of a patriarchal order, which has 
the overall function of policing and enforcing its governing ideology.”62  
Misogyny is thus coercive.63  Since misogyny is systemic enforcement of 
patriarchal power and is not about individual hate, mens rea—a crucial 
criterion in most criminal law—will not generally apply.  Individuals may be 
purposefully enforcing male dominance, but often they are just following 
social scripts and requiring others to do the same.  Thus, there is often no 
intent to harm. 
When we ask how misogyny harms women’s speech and participation in 
shared social life, feminists, following MacKinnon,64 have cited women’s 
subordination and our silencing.65  Many people find the subordination claim 
plausible and balk at silencing claims.  Silencing claims address women’s 
systematic exclusion from conversations, decision-making, and what Simone 
 
 56. MANNE, supra note 20, at 78–84. 
 57. Id. at 79–80. 
 58. FRYE, supra note 53, at 38. 
 59. Id. 
 60. MANNE, supra note 20, at 263–67. 
 61. Id. at 64. 
 62. Id. at 63. 
 63. Louise Richardson-Self, Woman-Hating:  On Misogyny, Sexism, and Hate Speech, 33 
HYPATIA 256, 261 (2017). 
 64. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1 (1985) (discussing pornography’s impact on the social status and 
treatment of women and advocating to define pornography as a civil rights violation). 
 65. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY:  FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT 
FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 83–106 (1995); Alisa L. Carse, Pornography:  An Uncivil Liberty?, 10 
HYPATIA 155, 163–67 (1995); Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 293, 300–28 (1993).  See generally Ishani Maitra, Subordinating Speech, in SPEECH 
AND HARM:  CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH 94 (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan 
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color); Lynne Tirrell, Pornographic Subordination:  How Pornography Silences Women, in 
ON FEMINIST ETHICS AND POLITICS 226 (Claudia F. Card ed., 1999) (examining a case in which 
pornographic images were used to sexually harass an individual and highlighting the lasting 
impact of that harassment). 
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de Beauvoir calls building “the world of tomorrow,”66 by making our 
discursive moves impossible.67  So, for example, Rae Langton introduced the 
concept of “illocutionary disablement” to explain how it is that when we do 
get to speak, our speech is often unable to achieve what we are aiming to 
achieve.68  The concept of “illocution” comes from philosopher J. L. Austin, 
who distinguished the mere “locution,” saying “I do,” from illocution, in 
some contexts, making a marital vow.69  Langton’s illocutionary disablement 
is illustrated well by contexts of sexual negotiation, in which a woman thinks 
her locution of “no” issues a sexual refusal (the illocution) but her speech act 
is defined by the hearer as something else entirely, a veiled “come on.”70  
Generally, the hearer’s meaning wins.  These mechanisms of illocutionary 
disablement silence our capacity to consent or refuse.71  Notably, across 
contexts, dominant meanings prevail, and those dominant meanings 
undermine women’s power to commit certain sorts of speech acts.  There’s a 
rich and growing philosophical literature on this.72 
Along a different vein, sometimes women are operating with what 
philosophers, following Miranda Fricker, call “credibility deficit[s].”73  We 
can utter the words, and our testimony may be item for item the same as that 
of a male counterpart, but gender norms undermine our credibility.  Austin 
argued that many speech acts can become misfires or be rendered moot if the 
hearer does not respond in the right way; Austin called these responses 
“uptake.”74  This Article argues that uptake can be construed weakly or 
strongly.  Weak uptake is simply a matter of grasping the speech act, 
recognizing the assertion, or understanding the illocutionary act.  This is an 
epistemic recognizing.  It occurs if the hearer “gets it,” but it does not require 
further engagement or use.  On a weak uptake analysis, an apology is still an 
apology even if the victim does not offer forgiveness in return.  As long as 
the hearer understands what is being said and grasps that it is an apology 
(whether effective or not), the speech act counts as apologizing.  Uttering 
apologetic words when the victim is asleep or knocked out, or in a language 
the speaker knows the victim does not understand, would make weak uptake 
impossible.  If weak uptake is impossible, the very speech act is called into 
 
 66. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY 82–83 (Bernard Frechtman trans., 
The Citadel Press 2d ed. 1964) (1948). 
 67. See Lynne Tirrell, Authority and Gender:  Flipping the F-Switch, 4 FEMINIST PHIL. Q., 
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 68. Langton, supra note 65, at 315–16. 
 69. J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 5 (1962).  Locution and illocution are 
distinct from “perlocution” (for example, upsetting one’s mom by marrying). 
 70. See Langton, supra note 65, at 315–16. 
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Injustice, 29 HYPATIA 440 (2014); Ishani Maitra, Silencing Speech, 39 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 309 
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 74. AUSTIN, supra note 69, at 138. 
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question as a misfire or perhaps an abuse of the conventions associated with 
that kind of action. 
Strong uptake, conversely, adds appropriate engagement and completes 
the illocutionary act.  A strong uptake requirement would say the apology 
only counts if the victim offers forgiveness in return.  To illustrate a speech 
act that requires the hearer to reply in a particular way, a variety of what I am 
calling strong uptake, Austin gives the example of betting.75  Sam can say, 
“I bet you $5 that it rains tomorrow,” but the bet is only completed if Jordan 
gives it strong uptake by saying, “You’re on!”76  Thus the illocutionary act 
of betting is completed.  Strong uptake requires consequent discursive action.  
One must use the illocution, either endorsing it or rejecting it.  If Jordan said, 
“No deal,” that would be strong uptake that blocks Sam’s move.  If Jordan 
wanted to challenge Sam’s offer of a bet, he might say, “You don’t even have 
$5.”  Blocking and challenging, as we will see in the next section, both 
undermine the completion of the speech act and, if successful, make it 
unavailable for use going forward. 
Rae Langton has developed a conception of blocking harmful speech 
according to which the hearer resists what I am calling strong uptake.77  
David Lewis argued that hearers tend to accommodate the speaker’s moves, 
which makes them count as fair play within the game and, thereby, changes 
permissible next moves.78  Langton’s concept of blocking is less direct than 
Robert Brandom’s challenges, for the blocker refuses to accommodate the 
speaker’s move and resists incorporating it into fair play.79  Often this is by 
denying the speaker’s presupposition.  So, for example, if Fred says, “You 
throw like a girl,” Ethel might block his presupposition (that this is a bad 
thing) by saying, “If you practice really hard, maybe you can throw this well 
someday.”  A direct challenge would be “What do you mean, ‘throw like a 
girl?’” or “You shouldn’t say ‘throw like a girl.’”  Blocking and challenging 
allow weak uptake and offer negations of what strong uptake would provide. 
Credibility deficits are less direct than blocking or challenging, and they 
come in many forms.  Consider Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony at the 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination of Justice 
Kavanaugh to the U.S. Supreme Court.80  Many of the men who sat in 
judgment said they believed her, thus admitting that they saw her clear 
 
 75. Id. at 36. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See generally Rae Langton, Blocking as Counter-Speech, in NEW WORK ON SPEECH 
ACTS 144 (Daniel Fogal et al. eds., 2018). 
 78. See generally David Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, 8 J. PHIL. LOGIC 339 
(1979). 
 79. See generally Langton, supra note 77. 
 80. See Written Testimony of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-27-18%20Ford%20Testimony%20 
Updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ2A-N62Q]. 
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credibility.81  Yet their judgment was that her testimony did not matter.82  
The candidate could indeed have committed a crime—attempted rape—and 
they deemed that he would still be worthy of a lifetime seat on the Supreme 
Court.  The message to women is clear:  crimes against you are not evidence 
of unfitness for power and are not evidence of failed character or poor 
judgment.  There was also the dicey political ploy of arguing, after the fact, 
that the Senate needed evidence, a move that Benjamin C. Zipursky shows to 
be ignorant of the law.83  Zipursky reminds us, 
Dr. Ford’s testimony, under oath, was evidence. It was not just allegations 
and accusations.  Part of having a system of justice is having law that 
defines what can count as “evidence.”  Under the law of any state in the 
nation and federal law, her testimony counts as evidence.  Once upon a 
time, a woman’s testimony actually did not count as evidence.  Today it 
does, because of centuries’ old legal changes dismantling our profoundly 
sexist system.84 
The broad sexism of American society weakened the force of Dr. Ford’s 
speech.  For all those who saw her as needing strong corroboration, for whom 
her words did not carry sufficient weight, she was speaking with a credibility 
deficit.  The depth of misogyny and male privilege is shown in the fact that 
the senators did not even regard Justice Kavanaugh’s behavior at the hearing 
to be conduct unbecoming of a judge.85  It was actually in clear violation of 
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, especially canon 1.86 
Misogynist speech takes many forms.  Each delivers a dose of toxicity, but 
not all doses matter.  Many could be brushed off, not taken up by those they 
aim to keep in place.  Remember Manne’s view that misogyny is the law 
enforcement branch of patriarchy; those who stay within bounds might not 
even notice such enforcement.87 
“Toxicity” is the degree to which a substance can harm an organism,88 so 
there will be variations in impact depending upon the state of the organism 
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encountering the toxin.  A strong organism encountering a weak dose might 
not even notice it.  This fits with linguist Victor Klemperer’s observation that 
“[w]ords can be like tiny doses of arsenic:  they are swallowed unnoticed, 
appear to have no effect, and then after a little time the toxic reaction sets in 
after all.”89  Writing as the Nazis were consolidating power in Germany, 
Klemperer raised the question:  “And what happens if the cultivated language 
is made up of poisonous elements or has been made the bearer of poisons?”90  
Misogyny is just such a toxic element, omnipresent but with varying strains 
and degrees of virulence.  Toxins have routes of delivery—via contact, 
ingestion, and the like—and so do discursive toxins. 
Misogyny is delivered through words, images, and discriminatory actions, 
enforcing women’s lower status, diminished authority and autonomy, and so 
much more.  Calling misogyny “toxic” does not require that it feel like a 
punch in the nose.  Keep the arsenic metaphor in mind:  it helps remind us 
that ubiquitously accepted, even customary, harmful speech is taken without 
awareness of the cumulative effect of multiple doses.  It is not clear how 
legally actionable such individual doses might be. 
II.  SPEECH AND COUNTERSPEECH 
The classic location of the counterspeech position lies in a well-known 
statement by Justice Brandeis:  “If there be time to expose through discussion 
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, 
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”91  Time 
matters.  The context must allow for discussion and processes of mutual 
education.  These high standards are not always available to the victim of 
toxic misogynist speech.  Even accepting, for the moment, the Supreme 
Court’s received opinion, we must recognize that the occasions on which 
counterspeech is appropriate are limited.  This approach might assume 
(falsely) that participants have equal standing in the speech situation, and yet 
Mill actually argued that inequality was a strong reason to favor freedom of 
expression.92  We should tackle the case of a vulnerable person facing a more 
powerful person or persons whose speech unjustly damages their well-
being.93 
This raises the issue of which kinds of counterspeech might stand a chance 
of blocking or challenging bad speech.  Effective counterspeech might be an 
antidote to the toxins spread by the misogynist message.  Not all 
counterspeech is effective, so it helps to understand what it takes to respond.  
Some background conditions, like identity factors and social position, 
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influence the impact of one’s speech in a context.  These conditions also 
influence what the initial speech act was doing.  In this Part, I introduce some 
concepts from the philosophy of language as tools that might help in 
considering remedies.  Robert Brandom has developed an account of 
challenges to assertions and inferences; if effective, these challenges deny 
the licenses that would otherwise be issued.94  Similarly, Rae Langton is 
developing an account of blocking bad speech.95  For Langton, blocking does 
not refute the bad speech or demand justification; instead, it refuses to 
accommodate its presuppositions, which takes away its power to influence 
further moves in the language game.96  Those seeking to design remedies to 
toxic speech could be helped by considering challenges and blocking. 
First, some very basic concepts are needed to understand how language 
works.  Language is a social practice, probably our most constitutive one.  It 
shapes and defines us.  We enact norms and laws in language.  This is why 
Lugones and Spelman argue for the importance of self-articulation.97  Within 
discursive practices, think of the various subpractices as language games, as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein has taught us to do.98  Language games are part of our 
way of life.  Calling structured discursive behavior a “game” does not signify 
that it is frivolous or playful.  Language games tend to be serious, purposive, 
and goal-oriented.  They arise within and contribute to the activities that 
make our lives possible.  Wittgenstein famously said that a language is a 
“form of life”; similarly, a language game must be considered in the context 
of the actions with which it is interwoven.99 
Usually, language games have three main types of actions.100  “Entrances” 
get us into the game, taking us from the world to language.  Moving from 
perceptual observations to speech, our observations serve as evidence we can 
use once in the game.  Within the game, some actions count as “internal 
moves” that license further actions and help us to get closer to our goals.  
These internal moves are patterns of inferences.  Some actions do not count 
as moves, as when one scratches an itch while delivering a speech.  It might 
distract, but unless it has been explicitly set up to do so, it does not count as 
a move.  Finally, “exit moves” take us out of the game, moving from 
language to the world.  With exit moves we see the power of language to 
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license actions and we see the causal harms that can be enacted by the 
inferential moves we make within the game. 
These concepts work with all sorts of language games.  Roughly applied 
to the legal system, we can see that a witness reporting a crime makes an 
entrance move into the criminal justice language game.  An officer takes the 
witness’s statements and writes a report.  Perhaps the officer follows up with 
an investigation of her own and adds another report.  These reports are sent 
to the district attorney, who draws inferences based on what has been said.  
Notice that the district attorney only has reports.  If the case is deemed 
credible, maybe it goes to trial.  We are still in the realm of inferences drawn 
from observations and testimonies.  Along the way, though, some of these 
inferences compel physical actions such as collecting forensic evidence, 
executing search warrants, and so on.  These actions result in more reports.  
To jump ahead, a trial judge issuing a sentence makes an exit move from all 
the evidence presented through discourse.  This sentence results in compelled 
behavior for many parties involved in the case.  The majority opinion issued 
by the Supreme Court is an exit move.  It settles law for a long while. 
In most arenas of life, not everyone enters every speech situation equally.  
This is sometimes appropriate and sometimes unjust.  Taking the game 
metaphor seriously, I have developed the notion of “game-assigned 
powers.”101  These apply to positions taken or assigned as one enters a game 
and generally govern the moves one can make within the game as well.102  In 
tennis, everyone enters the same way, and each player is entitled to make the 
same moves.103  In soccer, if you enter as a goalie, you get the special power 
of being able to pick up the ball with your hands without penalty, as long as 
you are within a certain area of the field.104  Game-assigned powers are 
obvious in a courtroom where, for example, entering as a witness, an 
attorney, or a judge generates different game-assigned powers to each party.  
Differential game-assigned powers become unjust when they are based on 
gender, race, sexual orientation, class, and other often socially salient identity 
factors.105 
The rules of testimony—who can speak when, what can be said, what has 
to be asked, what counts as an answer, and so on—are highly codified by 
precedent, practice, and sometimes by law.  For women, misogyny shapes 
our entry to nearly all speech situations.  Identity factors often serve as what 
philosophers call “felicity conditions”106 for game-assigned powers, and 
some identity factors disable moves that should be open to all players.  The 
question arises, then, of how the law might make women’s entrance to speech 
situations more just. 
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Misogynistic damage to our game-assigned powers is so ubiquitous, 
entrenched, and rarely noted that I doubt the law can do much.  On the other 
hand, Zipursky’s point that the law used to disallow all testimony from 
women, but now allows it, might generate hope for further improvements.107  
Also, one might think about the great inroads brought about by Title IX, 
which is not specifically about speech but about gendered activities in 
educational contexts.108  Conceptual changes and increased testimony by 
women have, indeed, made inroads in the fight against misogynist speech.  
The development of the concept of sexual harassment,109 laws that recognize 
that nonconsensual sex within marriage is actually rape,110 and rape shield 
laws that prohibit questioning the rape victim about her sexual history111 
have all made enormous differences to the lives of women.  Years before 
#MeToo, MacKinnon explained that “each woman who said she was abused 
looked incredible or exceptional; now, the abuse appears deadeningly 
commonplace.  Before, what was done to her was sex; now, it is sexual 
abuse.”112  This kind of reconceptualization is important to fighting the 
injustices of misogyny and fostering greater equality.  Even with shield laws 
in place, a deeper problem is how cross-examination proceeds.113  Our tools 
from philosophy of language can help explain why.  Equality in everyday life 
and equality before the law are both undermined by misogyny, which is 
expressed and enacted through words, speech acts, and the norms of 
acceptable engagement. 
Speech is a special case, less amenable to monitoring and management 
than Title IX compliance.  The problem of discursive practices is 
tremendously fine-grained.  A woman might be able to speak and have her 
speech count as credible in some sense, and yet it might not actually count as 
the speech act that it would have been if issued by a man.  It is not that 
illocutionary disablement stops her speech from achieving goals but that it 
stops her speech from being what it was issued as.  MacKinnon explained 
this with respect to women testifying about their abuse in the pornography 
industry, and she expressed outrage and frustration that their testimony just 
became more pornography.114  There’s a cruel twist to the logic of such 
illocutionary disablement.  Counterspeech might be able to create trends of 
resistance to illocutionary disablement.  Highlighting unjust game-assigned 
powers in specific speech situations might be able to wear away these 
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automatic assignments.  Two key forms of resistance are challenging and 
blocking.115 
Each move within a language game changes the possible next moves that 
are available to other players.  David Lewis argued that, with every 
conversational move we make, hearers tend to accommodate the 
presuppositions and assertions of speakers, which creates “permissibility 
facts” that serve as permissions for further speech.116  Accommodating a 
move makes it count as fair play.  Think of case law where the judicial 
affirmation of an argument makes it count as fair play in relevant future 
cases.  Developing this further, Brandom identified a more robust theory of 
the moves within language games, treating each speech act as a licensing 
inference that in turn licenses further inferences, and so on.117  For example, 
if I start talking about my sister, Pat, you can then talk about her based solely 
on my reference.  Also, what I say about her will issue further licenses, 
entitling you to say more detailed things.  If you are challenged on your 
claims, you can defer justification and say you got it from me.  If you draw 
some additional inferences of your own, those inferences are still based on 
my speech.  Counterspeech is built into this model in the challenges we are 
each entitled to make when our interlocutors make assertions.  Challenges 
tackle bad speech head-on.  If I start talking about my cat, you might say, 
“What are you talking about?!  I know you have dogs!”  This requires me to 
clarify, justify, or admit to the lie. 
Internal moves can be toxic in many ways:  through reductive 
classification, through highlighting or introducing nasty inferences, and 
through fostering unjust social divisions.  The elements and moves within an 
inferential role can be everyday toxins, even if the exit-move actions are not 
yet undertaken.  But their toxicity is most evident in the exit moves they 
license.  As we have seen, challenging is something we tend to do within the 
language game, and it tends to address the assertions others make.  We can 
also challenge licensed exit moves, and we can challenge someone’s 
expressive commitments—commitments to the viability and value of whole 
modes of discourse.  A student once told me that our feminism class, 
Feminism and Philosophy, enabled her to decide to challenge her boyfriend 
addressing her as “Bitch,” as in “Yo, Bitch!  Bring me another beer!”  This 
awful speech act is interesting because it conveys misogyny through both its 
diction and demand.  These are intertwined.  His disrespectful terms of 
address cast her as lesser, and the demand casts her as his servant.  Her 
response was, “There’s no ‘Bitch’ around here.  You will find the beer in the 
refrigerator.”  Her challenge to him is clear, and it hits on both the referential 
front (“don’t refer to me that way, don’t call me that”) and the exit move 
(“you are not licensed to order me to serve you”).  There is still something 
indirect in the challenge, which speaks to an important risk. 
 
 115. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 116. Lewis, supra note 78, at 346–47 (discussing the rules of accommodation). 
 117. See generally BRANDOM, supra note 94. 
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The speaker who insults and commands, as in this case, is certainly a bully.  
There is a risk that challenging him will result in a violent outburst.  
Bystanders often are not in a position to assess such risks and must respect 
that each hearer has to decide what to challenge, whether the challenge 
should be direct or indirect, and how to phrase it. 
Focusing on exit moves emphasizes the actions speech can license and puts 
conduct in the forefront.  My research into the changing speech practices in 
Rwanda in the years prior to the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi led me to focus 
on the action-engendering power of deeply derogatory terms.118  Calling 
someone a snake or a cockroach is not ipso facto embarking on a campaign 
of genocidal extermination, but the licenses issued by such discursive moves 
include licenses for extermination and, thus, murder.  It is a simpler step to 
go from calling someone “Bitch” to then demanding she serve you a beer. 
On this picture of speech as action, misogyny lives in every step.  First, 
women’s entry to speech situations is limited, often quite dramatically.  Once 
in a practice or game, we often face derogatory networks of inferences, 
assumptions, and presuppositions that deprive our speech of authority.  In 
such cases, we think we are making the same moves as our male counterparts, 
and yet our speech is deprived of its legitimate force.  That sometimes results 
from entering the speech situation with truncated game-assigned powers and 
sometimes from the accumulation of toxic inferences within the speech 
situation in the language game.  Finally, we often are deprived of the power 
to make the exit moves we think we are making, such as explicitly 
withholding sexual consent. 
Counterspeech in the individual case requires careful judgment of what 
was said, understanding what the speech act was (i.e., its illocution:  whether 
it was, for example, an assertion, promise, threat, or imperative), and 
assessments of likely outcomes.  Such determinations are complicated, but 
they matter.  If we do not challenge false assertions, biased presuppositions, 
and sexist, racist, or other biased speech, we let their licenses stand.  Others 
can easily take them up and run with them.  For example, Ethel challenging 
Fred will not mean that Ricky cannot take up Fred’s sexist license, but her 
challenge could render the license null and void or could require Ricky to 
work for it.  Counterspeech is the primary way that we stop bad inferences in 
their tracks, and it is stronger than blocking. 
CONCLUSION:  LAW, LANGUAGE, AND NORMATIVE CHANGE 
My concern has been widespread cases of gender-based disrespect, 
explicit claims as well as intimations that the rights of some do not matter, 
and other subtler expressions.  Sandra Bartky calls these “intimations of 
inferiority”;119 we can see such intimations everywhere around us, targeting 
women, people of color, the physically and mentally disabled, those with 
 
 118. See generally Tirrell, Genocidal Language Games, supra note 100; Lynne Tirrell, 
‘Listen to What You Say’:  Rwanda’s Postgenocide Language Policies, 27 NEW ENG. J. PUB. 
POL’Y, no. 1, 2015, at 1. 
 119. Bartky, supra note 45, at 7. 
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fluid gender identities, and more.  Such intimations are thoroughly normative 
and embedded in presuppositions and in practices of what can or cannot be 
said.  Every society uses them to set boundaries of power, acceptability, and 
access.  When these intimations are accompanied by a crime, like rape or 
sexual assault, the law clearly has a role (even if it is not particularly effective 
in either deterrence or punishment). 
I have been suggesting that counterspeech is complicated, and yet 
important, by focusing more at the arena of private interactions, outside legal 
cases or questions of speech codes and bans.  It would be hard to tailor such 
bans appropriately, even where they are most needed.  We must remember 
that words are used in speech acts, acts of expression that are also actions 
done to and about other people.  To treat speech as “only words” is to fail to 
grasp why we speak, what we do with our speech, and the impact speech has 
in the world.  As MacKinnon argued, 
Words and images are how people are placed in hierarchies, how social 
stratification is made to seem inevitable and right, how feelings of 
inferiority and superiority are engendered, and how indifference to violence 
against those on the bottom is rationalized and normalized.  Social 
supremacy is made, inside and between people, through making meanings.  
To unmake it, these meanings and their technologies have to be unmade.120 
Laws could intervene at each stage of the three-part picture of language.  
The law might demand equal entry, like Title IX’s demand for parity in 
educational and athletic opportunities121 and the way women’s testimony has 
been increasingly taken seriously at all stages of the legal system.122  Getting 
members of socially vulnerable groups into the game matters, but then one 
has to make moves.  The range of moves is often laid out by inferential roles 
already established by past speech acts and constrained by social hierarchies.  
Trying to find remedies against nasty internal moves—from language to 
language—will run afoul of the principle of viewpoint neutrality.123  In 
sexual harassment cases, for instance, much of the nasty language and gossip 
that leads to actionable events is itself not actionable.  Norms need to change.  
Changing our discursive practices is a crucial step in improving the climate 
and forestalling actionable events before the law can step in. 
Those focused on legal remedies, like tort claims or speech prohibitions, 
are likely to focus on exit moves because these reveal the harms that our 
practices enact.  Too often, however, a focus on exit moves shifts the focus 
onto conduct rather than speech.  The law is designed for regulating conduct, 
but our question is about how to protect and promote gender equality within 
contexts of grave inequality.  Protecting and promoting equality requires 
backpedaling to make changes in the action-engendering internal moves of 
 
 120. MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 31. 
 121. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 123. Kagan, supra note 13, at 897–99 (distinguishing between viewpoint neutrality and 
low-value content, but ultimately concluding that determinations of low-value content cannot 
alone justify abandoning the principle of viewpoint neutrality). 
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our language games.  We need to listen to what we say, unearth disparaging 
presuppositions, and challenge inferential roles that entrench inequality. 
Through challenges we can recraft the inferential roles of our terms, the 
licenses we issue and revoke, and so on.  In this way, we can change the 
norms that govern the language games we play.  We have seen this with the 
loss of acceptability in using “boy” for grown men of any color.  We have 
not yet seen it for “girl” or for images that subordinate and oppress women.  
Do we need laws to change the norms that govern language?  Sometimes.  
Law is a special kind of speech that has enforcement power—it is backed by 
the power of the state, so it forces strong uptake.  We cite the law, use it to 
structure other practices, and live and die within its limits.  Without feminist 
legal theorists and activists, we would not have the grasp of sexual 
harassment that we now have.  Gaining the words did not stop the crimes, 
but it did give us a framework for crafting new laws that have had an 
important impact on schools and workplaces.  The power of law should not 
be gainsaid, but to end misogyny and rein in the steady onslaught of 
misogynist discourse and images, we need so much more than what law can 
do.  We need to change the norms that govern our speech acts, images, and 
other discursive practices. 
